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PARTLY  ACCULTURATED  RELIGIOUS  ACTIVITY:




Many of today’s most vexing problems concerning the accommodation
of religious conscience involve religious groups and activities that straddle
the perceived boundary of the public versus private.  For example, in dis-
putes over same-sex marriage and religious liberty, it is generally agreed that
churches and clergy should be able to refuse to host or perform marriages,
because these entities fall within the private sphere.1  But religious entities
that reach out to provide services to the broader public provoke much more
controversy.  Think, for example, of Catholic Charities adoption agencies
that decline to place children with same-sex couples.2  Or think of the
intense controversy over religious nonprofit institutions—social service and
© 2016 Thomas C. Berg.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of St. Thomas
School of Law (Minnesota).  I delivered earlier versions of this paper at the Annual Law
and Religion Roundtable, Georgetown University Law Center, June 25, 2015; the Notre
Dame Law Review Symposium on “Religious Liberty and the Free Society: Celebrating the
50th Anniversary of Dignitatis Humanae,” November 6, 2015; and the Yale Law and Divinity
Schools’ Conference on “Law, Religion, and Politics: Challenges to Traditional Borders in
Global and Comparative Perspective,” November 7, 2015.  Thanks to the participants and
audience members at those events for helpful and challenging comments and questions.
1 See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise: Marriage
Equality and Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485, 511 (2014)
(noting that “[c]onsistent with the demands of the First Amendment, every state provides
religious liberty protections to the clergy,” but also criticizing this protection alone as
“hollow” and inadequate).
2 See, e.g., Patricia Wen, Calif. Charity Ends Full Adoptions, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 3, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/08/03/calif_charity_ends_
full_adoptions/; Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOS. GLOBE
(Mar. 11, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_chari
ties_stuns_state_ends_adoptions.
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educational institutions, primarily—that are seeking a full exemption from
the mandate to cover contraception in employees’ health insurance.3
To many critics, it is plainly improper to make any accommodation for
religious freedom in such cases.  They say that when a religious organization
hires people outside of the narrow confines of its faith, or becomes a signifi-
cant social-service provider, it should not be allowed to continue to act on
norms that the government has determined are unjust.  Once an organiza-
tion reaches out to others, it must follow whatever rules the state sets, no
matter what burden these rules place on religion.  That tendency lay behind
the original, very narrow exemption from the contraceptive mandate—an
exemption that gave no relief to anyone except churches and denomina-
tions.4  And opponents of exemptions from the mandate argue that exemp-
tions are forbidden—in the words of Fred Gedicks and Rebecca Van
Tassell—whenever a religious nonprofit “hire[s] from the general pool of
applicants, rather than exclusively from a specific religious group,” because
such a group employs “nonadherents or adherents who understand the
requirements of the affiliated religion differently.”5  Similarly, Caroline
Corbin argued, in the early stages of debate over the mandate, that any
exemption for religious nonprofit employers would improperly “foist[] the
Catholic Bishops’ religious views onto employees, whether or not they are
Catholic.”6  On the other side, of course, critics of the mandate believe that
exemptions for nonprofits are essential to preserve religious freedom.
This Article explores the idea that such problems involve cases of “partly
acculturated” religious activity.  This kind of activity falls somewhere between
two poles.  One pole is “unacculturated” religion: the activity of the small sect
3 See, e.g., HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (tabulating 56 lawsuits
brought against the contraceptive mandate by 140 “religious ministry” plaintiffs, including
37 universities and 40 religious charities); Zubik v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/zubik-v-burwell/ (noting grant of certiorari
in consolidated cases involving challenges by, among others, the Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged and several religious universities).
4 See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Pre-
ventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725,
8726 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 & 45 C.F.R. pt.
147) (providing that to be exempt from the mandate, a religious organization must,
among other things, “primarily” serve its own adherents and also must primarily “incul-
cat[e] . . . religious values”).  As I note later, the government eventually added an “accom-
modation” for religious nonprofits that are not legally part of a congregation or
denomination.  For discussion of the effect of the accommodation, see infra notes 44–46
and accompanying text.
5 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contra-
ception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 381 (2014). Gedicks and Van Tassell focused on exemptions of for-profit businesses,
but their language and logic also applied to “material” burdens on non-adherent employ-
ees of religious nonprofits.
6 Caroline Maia Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469, 1482
(2013).
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or minority faith whose doctrines are strange to the American majority or
whose adherents are mostly ethnic minorities or immigrants.  Think of Mus-
lims, Sikhs, Amish, or Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The other pole is “acculturated”
religion, usually engaged in by a larger faith, and defined primarily by the
harmony between its doctrines or practices and mainstream secular norms.
Acculturated groups tend to think that current secular morality helps realize
the true meaning of their faith, and they tend to be deeply involved in the
world.  Think of mainline Protestant denominations and non-Orthodox Jew-
ish bodies.
But as Part I of this Article discusses, many religious activities and groups
have features from both poles.  They are “acculturated” in that they seek to
reach out to the broader society and provide services that people of all beliefs
value: education, health care, social services of all kinds, from homeless shel-
ters to adoption to job training.  Their approach to these services overlaps
significantly, although to a varying degree, with the approach of other prov-
iders of these services.  And yet these religious providers are “unacculturated”
in that some of their doctrines and practices sharply clash with the dominant
secular values in their relevant sphere.  These groups make a claim to be able
to continue to provide services while continuing to follow their countercul-
tural doctrines and practices, which often reflect the core values that inspire
their service in the first place.  Their activities are partly acculturated, and
they argue that the law should respect their ability to remain so.
This Article argues that we should make real efforts to protect religious
freedom for partly acculturated religious activities and organizations.  We
should not reject their claims broadly or per se and thereby exclude them
from the efforts at accommodation that other groups receive.  The law
should not force all religious organizations and activities into one of the two
polar categories, acculturated or unacculturated.  Part II of this Article
presents several reasons why there is a strong interest in protecting the free-
dom to engage in partly acculturated religious activity.
Accommodating partially acculturated religious activity does present dis-
tinctive challenges.  In the very act of reaching out to people outside the
faith—as clients or employees—can’t those organizations cause harm, for
example by demanding standards of conduct from those people?  Because of
these complications, protection for partly acculturated religious activity can-
not be absolute.  But in Part III of this Article, I examine how we can address
those complications—and draw sensible lines concerning accommodation—
by relying on two concepts.  The clients and employees affected by such orga-
nizations should have (1) notice of the organization’s religious identity or
(2) alternative sources of receiving the services or opportunities in question.
I. PARTIAL ACCULTURATION
We can understand the problem posed by organizations such as Catholic
Charities, or a religiously affiliated college, through the lens of “accultura-
tion.”  This important and longstanding typology of religious activity distin-
guishes between groups (usually large) whose views harmonize with the
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL403.txt unknown Seq: 4 10-MAY-16 13:17
1344 notre dame law review [vol. 91:4
general culture and other groups (usually small) who depart, and often with-
draw, from the culture.  Theologian Ernst Troeltsch, chronicling the relation
of Christian denominations toward state and society, drew a famous distinc-
tion between “church” and “sect.”7  The church seeks to be “universal,” and,
to achieve mass membership, it “to a certain extent accepts the secular order,
. . . utilizes the State and the ruling classes, and weaves these elements into
her own life.”8  Sects, by contrast, “are comparatively small groups [that]
aspire after personal inward perfection, and . . . a direct personal fellowship
between the members” and accordingly “renounce the idea of dominating
the world” and adopt an “indifferent” or even “hostile” attitude toward state
and society.9  The prototypical “church” was the Roman Catholic Church or
the established Protestant bodies of northern Europe; the prototypical sects
were the medieval monastic movements or the Anabaptists of the
Reformation.
Later, theologian H. Richard Niebuhr refined Troeltsch’s two categories
into five, including the alternatives of “Christ of culture”—groups that har-
monize Christian ideals with the broader culture—and “Christ against cul-
ture”—groups that withdraw from culture because it is unredeemable.10
Sociologists of religion agree “that marginal religious groups or sects are
characterized by: 1) an emphasis on doctrinal purity; 2) hostility to or disasso-
ciation from the prevailing culture; and 3) a strict code of behavior.”11
Whatever the precise framework, we can speak of religious groups as rela-
tively “acculturated,” aligned with the dominant culture, or “unacculturated,”
antagonistic to or withdrawn from the culture.12
A group may be “unacculturated” in another sense relevant to conflicts
with the law.  Whatever its theological relationship to secular culture in the
abstract, the group may simply be small enough in a particular locality, or in
America in general, that it operates as an unacculturated sect.  For example,
Islam and Hinduism in general seek to affect other aspects of the culture and




10 See H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 45–115 (1951).
11 Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 652, 654 (1983) (citing NICHOLAS JAY DEMERATH & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND,
RELIGION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT: TRADITION AND TRANSITION 69–77 (1969)).
12 For applications of Niebuhr’s categories (adjusted in various ways) to Religion
Clause issues, see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 919, 959–62 (2004); Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated Religious
Conduct: Boundaries for the Regulation of Religion, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITOR-
ING AND REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 21, 29–37 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis
eds., 1993) (applying to free exercise cases, drawing from source provided by Berg, supra,
for some of the analysis); Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian
Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1992) (applying to
variety of Religion Clause issues); Way & Burt, supra note 11, at 665 (application to free
exercise cases).
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society around them, and in the Middle East and India they are the domi-
nant faiths; but in America they are minority groups whose social services and
educational institutions do not (yet) play significant roles in the broader
society.
The polar cases—religions that are truly unacculturated or truly accul-
turated—tend not to present the most difficult free exercise questions.  Small
faiths mostly operate in their houses of worship and in the lives of individual
believers who seek to live consistently with their faith in society.  But we have
a reasonably broad legal consensus that these groups and claims should be
protected: and not just that they should be free from discrimination, but that
their practices should enjoy some claim to accommodation when they con-
flict with generally applicable laws.13  To take just one example, the Supreme
Court was unanimous in holding in Holt v. Hobbs14 that a Muslim prisoner,
Gregory Holt, should be able to wear a beard for religious reasons even
though a state prison regulation forbade it.  Groups from across the political
and religious spectrum also filed briefs in support of Holt’s claim.15  On the
other end of the spectrum, acculturated religions raise relatively few free
exercise exemption issues in the first place.  They seldom stray very far, either
left or right, from mainstream norms: to the extent they do, they are what I
will call “partly acculturated.”
A map of religions based on their degree of acculturation is helpful for
analysis of church-state legal questions,16 but it also poses a number of com-
plications.  “ ‘[T]he sect-church typology is a continuum’; some faiths fall in
the middle (as, for example, with Jews who observe many Jewish laws but are
non-Orthodox),” and “any”—perhaps most—“religious groups harmonize
with the broader culture on some clusters of issues and conflict with it on
others.”17
In particular, some of the most important religious groups and activities
in America today are what are best described as “partly acculturated.”  They
are acculturated in that, as I have noted, they provide services of secular value
from which people of all beliefs may benefit—education, social services, or
health care—using the same methods, or largely the same methods, that
other providers use.  But they are unacculturated in that some of their doc-
13 See Berg, supra note 12, at 959–60 (“Unacculturated faiths are the outsiders, alien-
ated from dominant values, whom courts should be particularly concerned to protect.
Unacculturated faiths also tend to be numerical minorities” often “because they maintain a
demanding purity in doctrine and behavior rather than seeking mass membership.”).
14 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).
15 Amici supporting the prisoner’s claim included the Alliance Defending Freedom,
the American Civil Liberties Union (filing on behalf of former prison officials supportive
of his claim), Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Anti-Defamation
League of B’nai B’rith, the International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion (joined by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and several Protestant denomina-
tions both liberal and conservative). Holt v. Hobbs, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2015), http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/holt-v-hobbs/.
16 See sources cited supra note 12.
17 Berg, supra note 12, at 960 (quoting Way & Burt, supra note 11, at 652).
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trines and practices clash with the dominant secular values in their relevant
sphere.  They make a claim to be able to continue to provide acculturated
services while continuing to follow their countercultural doctrines and
practices.
For example, evangelical and Catholic nonprofit organizations—from
various colleges to the Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged—have
asserted claims against the contraceptive mandate, arguing that they ought to
be able to continue to serve and employ others without facilitating the provi-
sion of contraceptives (which in some cases, they assert, are likely to act as
abortifacients).18  Catholic adoption agencies have asserted that they should
continue to be licensed to place children in families without placing them
with same-sex couples, which in the agencies’ view would facilitate conduct
that the Church opposes on religious grounds.19  Catholic relief agencies
have claimed an interest in being able to cooperate with government in serv-
ing victims of human trafficking, including non-Catholics, without having to
provide, or give referrals for, abortion or contraception services.20  Some of
these disputes involve an organization’s claim to continue to receive govern-
ment funding.  But others involve (and probably more in the future will
involve) an organization’s defense against liability, fines, or licensure with-
drawals: government actions that threaten its ability to operate in the first
place.
Catholics and evangelical Protestants are the most obvious examples of
partly acculturated religions today.  As the examples provided suggest, these
two large groups have also raised the most controversial free exercise issues
in recent years.  Catholic and evangelical organizations are deeply involved in
American culture, providing extensive educational and social services to the
broader public, but they are also at odds with increasingly dominant values
on issues of sexual morality and justice.  It is no accident that they are
involved in many of the most contentious free exercise questions.
But it is important to emphasize that there are situations of partial accul-
turation in other faiths.  Even highly acculturated groups may dissent on a
18 For listings and summaries of the nonprofit challenges to the mandate, see for
example supra note 3.  With respect to abortion, the nonprofit challengers, like the for-
profit businesses and owners suing in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), believe that because a protected human life begins “from the moment of concep-
tion,” they would be facilitating abortion if they facilitated the provision of “four [contra-
ceptive] drugs and devices . . . that can prevent implantation of a fertilized egg.”  Brief for
Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191, at 8, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S.
Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Little-Sisters-
Merits-Brief.pdf; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
I believe that the nonprofit plaintiffs’ claims should fail—but not because they serve
and employ, and may affect, non-adherents. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
19 See supra note 2.
20 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 488 (D. Mass. 2012)
(striking down an accommodation by which federal government contracted with Catholic
organizations to provide trafficking-related services but without including abortion or
contraception).
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few aspects of culture, and of course whether a posture is dissenting or not
depends on the dominant culture, which varies greatly around the nation.
The “mainline,” generally highly acculturated, Protestant bodies are often
left of the mainstream in red states, and this sometimes results in legal con-
flicts.  Liberal churches and religious organizations have sued to challenge
laws preventing them from sheltering or otherwise assisting illegal immi-
grants,21 from serving the homeless in the church’s neighborhood,22 and
from barring guns on their premises.23  Acculturation, then, is a matter of
degree; and, I will argue, whatever groups are partly acculturated should
have a serious claim to accommodation in cases where their practices and
identity clash with the law.
Partly acculturated religions pose some of the most controversial and
challenging free exercise questions in courts and legislatures today.  Some of
the reasons are not necessarily inherent in the idea of “partly acculturated”
religion.  It happens that the most prominent partly acculturated groups,
Catholics and evangelicals, are seen as intolerant of others’ rights, especially
because they have promoted laws to bar abortion and same-sex marriage.24
That is not a reason for them to lose their free exercise rights.25  But not
surprisingly, it predisposes many people to have very little sympathy for them.
But there is an inherent challenge in accommodating partly accultur-
ated religions, because they reach out to the world at the same time as they
assert certain values increasingly alien to it.  This shows up in the policies of
21 See Iulia Filip, Bishops Say Alabama’s Harsh Immigration Law Would Criminalize Religious
Sacraments, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/
08/04/38714.htm.
22 See Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL 3235317, at
*27 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012) (applying Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) against city regulations that prevented religious organizations from feeding home-
less in public park); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp.
538, 547 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying federal RFRA against zoning regulations that prevented
church from feeding homeless on its premises).
23 See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 213 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008) (ruling for church based on religion-protective standard under Minnesota
Constitution).
24 See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2543, 2578 (2015) (noting that
these objectors “invoke complicity-based conscience claims when they cannot entrench
traditional morality through laws of general application,” and arguing that such dynamics
make accommodation of such claims problematic because they “intensify the stigmatiza-
tion that [such] accommodation . . . can produce”).
25 Neither religious principles nor the protection of religious liberty can be a sufficient
ground for government to deny same-sex marriage rights. See, e.g., Brief of Douglas Lay-
cock et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11–12, 20–24, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Douglas Laycock & Thomas
C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (2013).
But conversely, the fact that a religious group wrongly seeks to write its opposition to same-
sex marriage into law does not mean it loses the right to act consistently with that opposi-
tion in other ways.
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religious nonprofit organizations regarding employment and service provi-
sion.  As the arguments above show, critics of accommodation argue that
once an organization reaches out to—and thereby affects—others, it must
follow every government rule no matter how great a burden the rule imposes
on religion.
Partly acculturated religions do raise real complications.  But I will argue
that they should have protection too.  We should make real efforts to accom-
modate them, like other faiths; we should not reject their claims broadly or
per se.  The law should not force all religious organizations and activities into
one of the two polar categories, acculturated and unacculturated.
II. REASONS TO PROTECT PARTLY ACCULTURATED RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY
This Part presents three arguments why we should make efforts to
accommodate partly acculturated religious organizations when they serve
and employ non-adherents but still seek to maintain their distinctive religious
standards.  While protection for such activities cannot be absolute, these
arguments show that there is a significant interest in protecting them, an
interest that should weigh strongly in the balance.
A. Equality Among Religious Denominations
First, making efforts to accommodate partly acculturated religious orga-
nizations serves the First Amendment goal of equality among religious
groups.  It is a legitimate way of being religious to serve and employ individu-
als in the broader society and still maintain one’s distinctive religious stan-
dards.  If we are going to accommodate religious exercise—and we should—
we should be aware of the conflicts and give thought to the actual situations
of religious institutions.  We should not be happy if the law forces all organi-
zations into two rigid categories of unacculturated or acculturated.  As the
former president of Catholic Charities USA has put it, a religious nonprofit
entity should not be “penalize[d] . . . for being—[for] working as a commu-
nity organization.”26
As the Court stated in Larson v. Valente,27 “[t]he clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be offi-
cially preferred over another.”28  The same passage stated that “[the] consti-
tutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected
with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause” as well.29  Both relig-
ion clauses indicate that explicit distinctions among religious organizations
should be reviewed carefully: the state should not draw lines based on unex-
26 Larry Snyder, President, Catholic Charities USA, Remarks at the Brookings Insti-
tute: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of Government Partnerships with Faith-
Based and Neighborhood Organizations 172 (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/
~/media/events/2010/2/18-community-partnerships/20100218_faith_based.pdf.
27 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
28 Id. at 244.
29 Id. at 245.
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amined assumptions about the categories into which religious organizations
should fit.  This principle applies to different religions’ decisions about how
to relate to the broader culture, as Michael McConnell has shown in an arti-
cle discussing the relevance of H. Richard Niebuhr’s categories for church-
state questions.30  Niebuhr’s insight, McConnell says, “is that there is no sin-
gle Christian answer to the relationship of Christ and culture, and that the
question must be left to ‘the free decisions of individual believers and respon-
sible communities’” because the question is debated and involves “profound
theological content.”31  Accordingly, McConnell argues, “for the state to seek
to impose one model of church participation in public affairs would be a
serious mistake.”32
The provision struck down in Larson is instructive.  Minnesota had
applied its laws regulating nonprofit solicitation to religious organizations
that received more than fifty percent of their contributions from non-mem-
bers, but it exempted those that did not.33  The Court held that this regula-
tion “clearly grants denominational preferences of the sort consistently and
firmly deprecated in our precedents” and thus was subject to, and flunked,
strict constitutional scrutiny.34  The majority rejected the state’s argument
that the distinction was “simply a facially neutral statute, the provisions of
which happen to have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different religious organiza-
tions.”35  “On the contrary,” the Court said, the statute “makes explicit and
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.”36  The
Minnesota law per se excluded organizations from protection if they solicited
non-members; if that was denominational discrimination, then so it would
seem is a law that per se excludes organizations from protection if they serve
or employ non-members.
It is overly strong medication to apply Larson, and the strictest form of
constitutional scrutiny, to every instance of a statutory exemption whose
explicit terms cover some religious organizations and not others.  Such dis-
tinctions can reflect legitimate attempts to balance the strength of the relig-
ious interest in accommodation against the societal interests in the
underlying regulation.  And if all such distinctions are invalid, the states
might react by giving no exemptions in the first place.37
Nevertheless, it is important to try to avoid inequalities among religions,
at the very least those that result from thoughtless or hasty judgments about
which categories of organizations have strong religious interests.  This sug-
30 See McConnell, supra note 12, at 193.
31 Id. at 220 (quoting NIEBUHR, supra note 10, at 233).
32 Id.
33 Larson, 456 U.S. at 230.
34 Id. at 246–47.
35 Id. at 246–47 n.23.
36 Id.
37 This concern is emphasized in the Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28–38, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-
1418 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Brief of Baptist Joint Committee], http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Zubik-BJC-Amicus-Final.pdf.
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gests that the government ought to give a good reason for explicitly exclud-
ing such organizations from protection.38  More importantly, when the
government imposes a substantial burden on a religious organization, it may
be subject to a religious-freedom statute, federal or state, that requires it to
justify the imposition of the burden as the least restrictive means of serving a
compelling interest.39  Under this stringent test, the fact that the government
has accommodated another religious group will undercut the government’s
asserted compelling need to regulate this group, at least if the two groups are
at all analogous.  On that basis, the Supreme Court forbade prosecution of a
sect that ingested a hallucinogenic tea at its worship service, in large part
because the government had already permitted sacramental peyote use by
Native Americans that involved similar asserted harms.40
In evaluating the contraceptive mandate, the easiest case is presented by
the mandate’s original form, which denied protection altogether not only if
an organization employed significant numbers of people from outside its
faith, but also if it (1) served significant numbers outside the faith or (2)
engaged primarily in service rather than the “inculcation of religious values,”
that is, teaching or proselytization.41  Any one of these features would be
enough to withhold exemption and subject the organization to large penal-
ties for not covering contraception.  The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) never explained—it could not explain—why a regulation
ostensibly designed to protect non-member employees should be applied to an
organization that employs its own members but does so in order to serve
others.42  To regulate organizations based on their service activities was
38 An example can be seen in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), where the
Court upheld Congress’s decision, in the military-draft statutes, to exempt persons who
objected to all war but not those who objected to a particular war as unjust.  The latter
objections, the Court found, would be far more difficult to administer. Id. at 455–60.
Although the Court rejected the selective objector’s claim, it did so only after engaging in
extensive analysis showing that they presented “substantial difficulties of real concern to a
responsible legislative body.” Id. at 456.  While this is not strict scrutiny, it is far more than
deferential rationality review.
39 See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
40 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434–37
(2006).
41 Specifically, the original provision covered any organization unless it met all of the
following criteria: “(1) Has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily
employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its
religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization described in section 6033(a)(1) and
section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code.”  Group Health Plans
and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 6033(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(i), (a)(3)(A)(iii) (2012)).
42 There are many examples, especially among evangelical agencies such as World
Vision and World Relief, which provide relief to all persons in need but hire only professed
Christians. See Christian Commitment, WORLD RELIEF, http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/569ed9b3a976af229c5ff3cd/t/56d76b10b09f951a53f87e35/1456958224712/Chris
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utterly disconnected from the mandate’s employee-protection goals.  For
that reason, if the original, full-bore mandate to cover contraception had
been challenged by an organization that served non-adherents but employed
only adherents, it very likely would have been struck down as unconstitu-
tional under Larson.
It is more defensible to apply an employee-protective rule to organiza-
tions that employ, rather than simply serve, non-members.  But even in that
case, a flat rule denying accommodation to all such organizations implicates
the policy against explicit differential treatment of religious organizations.
Just as engaging in acts of service is a legitimate, familiar way of exercising
religion, so is engaging in acts of service carried out by persons who do not
believe all of the religion’s tenets but are sympathetic to its service mission.
When it is possible to accommodate the latter sort of organization, the princi-
ple of denominational equality cuts against excluding it flatly from accommo-
dation.  Whether or not a court would invalidate such a selective denial of
accommodation on the strength of Larson, the principle of denominational
equality favors extending accommodation, unless doing so would unavoid-
ably contradict strong state interests.
It is no answer to assert that partly acculturated organizations are not
disqualified from religious freedom protection altogether—that they still
enjoy the right to resolve purely “internal” matters such as choosing their
clergy and other leaders, determining their doctrines, and so forth, without
government interference.43  If accommodation is denied per se whenever it
would affect a non-adherent, then organizations lose protection for the very
thing that makes them partly acculturated: their decision to reach out and
employ or serve non-adherents while still maintaining countercultural rules
of conduct throughout their activities.  If protection covers only purely inter-
nal matters, it will stop at the very point where the organization needs protec-
tion in order to preserve its identity of partial acculturation.
In the case of the contraceptive mandate itself, the Obama Administra-
tion ultimately recognized that religious nonprofits could employ or serve
others and still deserve religious freedom protection.  It created the so-called
“accommodation,” under which objecting religious nonprofits would not
have to pay for contraception coverage or include it in their plan and their
insurer or a third-party administrator would cover the employee directly.44
In my view, the accommodation probably sufficed to remove the substantial
tian_Commitment_World_Relief.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (“All World Relief employ-
ees must accept and acknowledge the Statement of Faith . . . as a condition of employ-
ment.”); Job Opportunities, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/about-us/job-
opportunities/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (requiring that employees “agree
wholeheartedly with our Statement of Faith or the Apostles’ Creed,” because “[a]s the
foundation for all we do, our Christian faith is a uniting factor among staff”).
43 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012) (reaffirming protection of the right to choose clergy as part of the right to
control “the internal governance of the church”).
44 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014).
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burden that the mandate otherwise would have imposed on these profits.45
It therefore made inapplicable the stringent equal-treatment requirement
demanded by the compelling-interest test of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act.46  But had the government not made the accommodation—had it
continued to exclude any religious nonprofit that employed or served
others—the mandate would have faced a serious challenge under RFRA.
B. The Distinctive Contributions of Partially Acculturated Organizations
A second reason to accommodate partly acculturated organizations is
that they tend to create large social capital and contribute significantly to
society through education and social services.  It will be a real loss if a signifi-
cant number of them are driven from their work because their tenets conflict
with legal rules.  As I will explain shortly, this argument is not simply one of
policy.  It resonates in our constitutional tradition, which has valued freedom
for religious organizations in part for the contributions they make to civil
society: the ways in which they promote civic virtue.47  (To be clear: I mean
here to defend giving these organizations religious freedom, not favoritism.
And the argument here is not that partly acculturated religious activities
should be protected more than others—only that they too should be accom-
modated, like other religious activities, when they do not involve serious
harm to society or other persons).
This Section first presents evidence concerning the distinctive contribu-
tions of partly acculturated organizations.  It then explores the relevance of
those contributions to religious freedom.
1. Distinctive Contributions
To examine the distinctive contributions of partly acculturated religious
activity, we can begin with a few suggestive data points.  They concern the
three groups that most obviously qualify as partly acculturated: Catholics,
white evangelicals, and African-American evangelicals.48  John DiIulio writes
45 For a detailed argument to this effect, see Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra
note 37.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
47 See infra subsection II.A.2.
48 African-American churches and their affiliated entities tend to combine engage-
ment in social service programs with unacculturated elements such as a greater role for
conversion and proselytism in the programs.  For example, in Pew Research Center
surveys, “[n]early four-in-ten African-Americans (39%) and 35% of Hispanics say that relig-
ious groups that encourage conversion should be eligible to apply for funding to provide
social services, compared with just 25% of non-Hispanic whites.” Faith-Based Programs Still
Popular, Less Visible, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/
16/faith-based-programs-still-popular-less-visible/ (describing results from 2009 and 2001
surveys).  Black church members, while liberal on many political issues, also adhere to
some traditionalist standards of sexuality and morality. See, e.g., Changing Attitudes on Gay
Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-
slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (noting that as of 2015, “[s]upport for
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that these are “the three religious communities that figure most prominently
in serving members and nonmembers alike”; each group “showers volunteer
hours and money on nonmembers who tend to be unlike members in terms
of race, socioeconomic status, or religion.”49  Political scientist Steven Mon-
sma has collected statistics and case studies showing that “religious congrega-
tions and other faith-based organizations [as a whole] constitute a large
portion of the American human services safety net”50—and he gives exam-
ples specifically from organizations that maintain “unacculturated” elements
in their activity.
For example, in some important areas such as prisoner reentry initia-
tives, faith-based groups that include explicit religious messages in their pro-
grams “tap [in]to” those messages “to motivate and encourage”
beneficiaries.51  For example, a report on a Michigan reentry program con-
cludes that explicitly faith-based institutions can “affect returning prisoners
in ways that other programs do not,” because they “can help create the condi-
tions for personal transformation, provide inspiration, and motivate individu-
als to achieve individual goals.”52  In the international relief area, some of
the largest and most vital nonprofit agencies fall into the partly acculturated
category, serving others widely while maintaining religious standards for their
employees.  These agencies include World Vision, which has 40,000 staff
members in more than 100 countries: more staff, as New York Times columnist
Nick Kristof has pointed out, “than CARE, Save the Children and the world-
wide operations of the United States Agency for International Development
. . . combined.”53  Finally, the distinctive success of Catholic schools in edu-
cating the poor—mostly because of the social capital the schools create—has
same-sex marriage among black Protestants and white evangelical Protestants remains
lower” (34 and 24 percent respectively) “than among other religious groups” (62 percent
for white mainline Protestants, 57 percent for Catholics)).
49 JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GODLY REPUBLIC: A CENTRIST BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICA’S FAITH-
BASED FUTURE 158 (2007).
50 STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PLURALISM AND FREEDOM: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 18 (2012) (quoting study by nonprofit experts that estimated that
one-fifth, at the very least, of all nonprofit organizations providing human services are
faith-based in nature); see id. at 18–22 (summarizing multiple studies showing similar sig-
nificant percentages of overall providers).  I review this evidence at greater length in
Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious Organizational Freedom, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 279, 309–13 (2013). See also generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA & STANLEY W. CARL-
SON-THIES, FREE TO SERVE: PROTECTING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZA-
TIONS (2015).
51 MONSMA, supra note 50, at 42.
52 Id. at 39 (quoting MICH. PRISONER REENTRY INITIATIVE, ISSUES OF FAITH, JUSTICE AND
FORGIVENESS: WORKING WITH FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO FOSTER DIVERSITY OF MISSION
6 (Sept. 2008) (emphasis omitted)).
53 MONSMA, supra note 50, at 21 (quoting Nicholas Kristof, Learning from the Sins of
Sodom, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/28
kristof.html?_r=0).
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been documented by many scholars, most recently Nicole Garnett and Mar-
garet Brinig.54
Statements from these agencies give a sense of how religious beliefs are
intertwined with the energy and commitment that make the entities vigorous.
The Catholic Health Association objected to the original form of the HHS
mandate, which gave little or no religious freedom protections to anyone
other than churches and denominations, on these terms:
Catholic health care providers are participants in the healing ministry of
Jesus Christ.  Our mission and our ethical standards in health care are
rooted in and inseparable from the Catholic Church and it’s [sic] teachings
about the dignity of the human person and the sanctity of human life from
conception to natural death.55
World Vision, the large evangelical relief agency, may be terminated from
federal government contracts now because its standards for employees forbid
sex outside of male-female marriage.  Its general counsel has emphasized the
importance of its religious identity to its work:
We are not just another humanitarian organization, but a branch of the
body of Christ. . . . The key to our effectiveness is our faith, not our size.  If
we would lose our birthright, if we ever would not be able to determine our
team, we’d lose our vision.56
To reiterate, my point is not to argue for Catholics and evangelicals as
such; my interest is in partly acculturated religious activity as a category.
Such activities, I posit, have features that tend to make them energetic in
providing services to the broader society.  On the one hand, their countercul-
tural positions tend to create a sense of identity and commitment among
their members—while on the other hand, their acculturation means they
apply that identity to attempt to serve society rather than withdrawing from
54 See MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST COMMU-
NITY: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS’ IMPORTANCE IN URBAN AMERICA (2014); see also ANTHONY S. BRYK
ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 297–304 (1993) (emphasizing results
caused by, among other things, sense of community, decentralized and non-bureaucratic
governance, and “inspirational ideology” of personal dignity); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED 187
(1982) (emphasizing discipline, academic demands, and other school policies); ANDREW
M. GREELEY, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS (2002) (emphasizing quality of
teaching and effectiveness of discipline).
55 Letter from Carol Keehan, President, Catholic Health Ass’n, et al. to Marilyn Taven-
ner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 4 (June 15, 2012), https://
www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/061512-cha-comments-on-anprm-on-wo
men_s-preventive-services-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=4.  After the Obama Administration strengthened
its accommodation for non-church entities, the CHA withdrew its objection.  Michael Sean
Winters, Catholic Health Association Says It Can Live with HHS Mandate, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP.
(July 9, 2013), http://ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/breaking-cha-can-live-hhs-
mandate.
56 MONSMA, supra note 50, at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting interview by Stephen
V. Monsma with Steven T. McFarland, Chief Legal Counsel, World Vision (May 24, 2010)).
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or simply denouncing it.  Let me explicate both of those claims, drawing on
recent work, both academic and more popular, in the sociology of religion.
Begin with the importance of countercultural elements.  Some forty
years ago, Dean Kelley investigated the question why “conservative”
churches—primarily evangelical Protestants and Mormons—were growing
while their ecumenical (“mainline”) Protestant counterparts were beginning
to hemorrhage members.57  (These trends, although fairly new when Kelley
first wrote in 1972, continued after his study was published.58)  Kelley was no
foe of liberal Protestantism; he served as an executive in the liberal National
Council of Churches and wanted to understand the declines the mainline
churches were experiencing.  He posited that evangelicals and Mormons
attracted people and maintained greater vigor because they made
countercultural demands for commitment from their members—in contrast
with the far more lenient attitude of the mainline churches.  More precisely
then, his thesis was that “strict churches are strong,” “whether liberal or
conservative.”59
Kelley’s argument began with what he called the three key traits of a
strong social group: “commitment,” “discipline,” and “missionary zeal.”60
The first two reflect the fact that the drive for “meaning” is a fundamental
trait of human beings.  But they also reflect the fact that “meaning” in this
sense does not involve simply concepts and ideas, what Quakers call mere
“notions.”61  Rather, meaning involves “concept plus demand”: the call to
57 DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE GROWING: A STUDY IN THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF RELIGION (ROSE ed., 1986 prtg.). Compare id. at 6–11 (tracing “a significant
[yearly] decline in the latter half [of the 1960s]” in the five major ecumenical denomina-
tions—Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and United Church of Christ—in
membership as well as in budgets, church construction, and church school enrollment),
with id. at 21–25 (tracing membership increases in same period of between 2.26% and
9.2% per year in bodies such as Southern Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Nazarenes,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Assemblies of God).
58 See id. at xvii (1977 prtg.); id. at x–xvi (preface to 1986 prtg.).  The trends continued
through 2014: by that year mainline Protestantism had an estimated five million fewer
adult adherents than in 2007, a drop from 18.1% to 14.7% of the overall adult population,
while white evangelicals had two million more adults than in 2007 (still a drop of about
one percentage point in the share of the overall population, but a far smaller drop).
America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2015), http://www.pew
forum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/.
59 KELLEY, supra note 57, at xvii–xviii (1977 prtg.).  Kelley noted the relatively low
demands that many mainline churches put on their members. Id. at 81–94.  Likewise,
economist Laurence Iannaccone, whose own work concerning “strict churches” built on
Kelley’s thesis, has commented, “One need not look far to find an anemic congregation
plagued by free-rider problems—a visit to the nearest liberal, mainline Protestant church
usually will suffice.”  Laurence R. Iannaccone, Why Strict Churches Are Strong, 99 AM. J. SOC.
1180, 1185 (1994); see infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text (discussing Iannaccone’s
argument).  But the problem is not inherent in mainline theology; liberal churches could
also impose stricter demands. See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
60 KELLEY, supra note 57, at 58.
61 Id. at 52.
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stake something on the belief, to commit to it.  What “enables religious
meanings to take hold is not their rationality, their logic, their surface credi-
bility, but rather the demand they make upon their adherents and the degree
to which that demand is met by commitment.”62
Religions that retain a countercultural element—that articulate a mean-
ing counter to the dominant culture and enforce it—are able to inspire com-
mitment.  Their members “are willing to put in more effort for their cause
than most people do for even their fondest personal ambitions.”63  Thus, the
discipline that promotes effectiveness involves the “willingness to suffer sanc-
tions for infraction rather than leave the group.”64
Kelley made clear, eventually if not initially, that his argument did not
simply apply to conservative churches.  As he wrote in a later preface, “A
more accurate title [for his book] might be ‘Why Strict Churches Are
Strong’—whether ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative,’ whether ‘growing’ in member-
ship at the moment or not.”65  He explicitly denied that “the only content
about which churches can be strict is fundamentalism,” explaining: “Just as
there are many ways to articulate and inculcate ultimate meaning (some bet-
ter than others) so there are many ways in which serious/strictness can be
expressed and invoked.”66  Theologically liberal religious communities can
be strict in demanding commitment to their defining norms and practices:
for example, they might demand commitment to the social activism that is
central in many liberal theologies.67  The key is for the community to have
62 Id. at 53.
63 Id. at 51, 53 (commitment involves “a personal and social earnestness shown by the
investment by real people of time, money, effort, reputation, and self in the meaning and
the movement that bears it”).
64 Id. at 58.
65 Id. at xvii.
66 Id. at xxii–xxiii (adding examples of such “contemporary and nonfundamentalist
modes” of higher-demand Christianity).
67 One commentator on American religious sociology has explored this possibility:
So what if liberal Protestants kept their open-minded, tolerant theology, but
started being strict about it—kicking people out for not showing up, or for not
volunteering enough?  Liberals have historically been wary of authority and its
abuses, and so are hesitant about being strict.  But strictness matters, if for no
other reason because conservatives are so good at it: most of the strict, costly
requirements for belonging to Christian churches in American [sic] today have to
do with believing theologies that contradict science, or see non-Christians as
damned.  What if liberal Protestantism flexed its muscle, stood up straight, and
demanded its own standards of commitment—to service of God and other peo-
ple, to the dignity of women, and to radical environmental protection?  Parishio-
ners would have to make real sacrifices in these areas, or they’d risk exclusion.
They couldn’t just talk the talk.  By being strict about the important things, could
liberal Protestant churches make their followers walk the walk of their faith—and
save their denominations in the process?
Connor Wood, Why IS Liberal Protestantism Dying, Anyway?, PATHEOS (July 26, 2013), http://
www.patheos.com//blogs/scienceonreligion/2013/07/why-is-liberal-protestantism-dying-
anyway/.
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some such strict, distinctive demands, rather than simply letting members or
participants bring into the community whatever norms exist in the surround-
ing culture.  In other words, the key is for the community to be, at least
partly, unacculturated.
These arguments for “strict” religion have been formalized, refined, and
defended by rational-choice theorists of religion, who aim to explain why
churches would make demands for standards of conduct that seem unattrac-
tive from a rational perspective.  For example, Laurence Iannaccone argues
that strict demands “‘strengthen’ a church in three ways: they raise overall
levels of commitment, they increase average rates of participation, and they
enhance the net benefits of membership.”68  These strengths, he says, arise
“because strictness mitigates free-rider problems that otherwise lead to low
levels of member commitment and participation.”69
As Iannaccone explains: “Free riders threaten most collective activities,
and religious activities are no exception.  Church members may attend ser-
vices, call upon the pastor for counsel, enjoy the fellowship of their peers,
and so forth, without ever putting a dollar in the plate or bringing a dish to
the potluck.”70  In the dynamic familiar from other collective situations, the
failure to police free riders generates “a pervasive lack of commitment that
leaves many potential members feeling that the group has little to offer,” and
thus unwilling to devote their own energies.71
In contrast, strict demands impose costs that “screen out people whose
participation would otherwise be low, while at the same time they increase
participation among those who do join.”72  Penalties and prohibitions
attached to behavioral restrictions tend to dissuade “the less committed
members.  [Penalties and prohibitions] act like entry fees and thus discour-
age anyone not seriously interested in ‘buying’ the product.  Only those will-
ing to pay the price remain.”73  As a result, “[t]he seductive middle
ground”—of participating minimally while reaping the group’s benefits—“is
eliminated, and, paradoxically, those who remain find that their welfare has
been increased.”74  The most easily enforced demands, Iannaccone says, are
those for visible conduct such as “distinctive diet, dress, grooming, and social
customs.”75  But even restrictions on “potentially private activities”—smok-
ing, drinking, sexual practices, and so forth—can be effective because of
“self-enforcement mechanisms” (“guilt, habit”) and because “deception
remains costly.”76
68 Iannaccone, supra note 59, at 1183.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1202.
72 Id. at 1183.
73 Id. at 1187.
74 Id. at 1188.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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Reviewing surveys of active participation within different religious
groups, Iannaccone concludes that “[t]he character of the group—its distinc-
tiveness, costliness, or strictness—does more to explain individual rates of
religious participation than does any standard, individual-level characteristic,
such as age, sex, race, region, income, education, or marital status.”77
A variation on the free-rider theory, set forth by anthropologist William
Irons, emphasizes that costly or unpopular religious practices are “signals of
commitment” by the community’s members.78  This account likewise begins
with the necessity of commitment among members to overcoming their indi-
vidual interests when those conflict with the goals and needs of the commu-
nity.  Such commitment can produce, and perhaps is necessary to producing,
trust and reciprocity, “the basis for mutually supportive relationships that
would not be possible without such trust.”79  Commitments must be signaled
in order to generate trust, but the possibility of false commitments—of free
riding—threatens to undercut trust, and, therefore, for “signals of commit-
ment to be successful they must be hard to fake.”80  And “[o]ther things
being equal, the costlier the signal the less likely it is to be false.”81
In Irons’ model, religions in general tend to serve as “hard-to-fake signs
of commitment.”82  Faking a religious commitment presents difficulties in
general, because the process of learning and practicing a religion is time
consuming and often costly in other ways.83  Moreover, as the last phrase
suggests, the signaling of commitment should tend to be more powerful in
religions that require more costly practices: that is, that make more strict or
“countercultural” demands.  Thus, “[o]ther things being equal, we should
expect that more costly religions are more effective at creating intragroup
cooperation.”84  This dynamic can help explain “[t]he stigmatizing and often
peculiar behaviors required by strict churches, such as wearing distinctive
clothing, abstaining from certain foods or drinks, and moving to a
commune.”85
77 Id. at 1200.
78 William Irons, Religion as a Hard-to-Fake Sign of Commitment, in EVOLUTION AND THE
CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT 292 (Randolph Nesse ed., 2001).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 298.
81 Id. (giving examples of how pursuing a college degree gives employers an indicium
of one’s commitment to a career, and how completing basic training gives an indication of
one’s commitment to military service).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 299.
85 Michael McBride, Why Churches Need Free-Riders: Religious Capital Formation
and Religious Group Survival 6 (Aug. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://econ
faculty.gmu.edu/pboettke/workshop/fall07/McBride.pdf (arguing that because such
practices “raise an individual’s cost of membership” and “are easier to observe than other
actions associated with religious effort,” a church has reasons to police commitment on the
basis of “compliance with these codes of conduct”).
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At the same time, the commitment and discipline of an organization’s
members will not provide benefits to society if it directs its activities wholly
inwardly.  Kelley’s third component of social strength is “eagerness to tell the
‘good news’ of one’s salvation to others,” instead of keeping it within the
insular group.86  Iannaccone ultimately argues that organizations must seek
some combination of strictness and openness: an “optimal level of strictness”
that will vary according to the “target population of potential members.”87
Groups that fall below this level will suffer “from free-rider problems and
hence from a pervasive lack of commitment.”88  But groups that exceed opti-
mal strictness or insularity “will tend to scare off many potential members
with what are perceived as excessive demands.”89  Iannaccone notes that
some groups experience “encapsulation” early on, because they are so
demanding and never grow beyond insular status.90  To remain strong—to
generate commitment and intra-group trust—a group must make demands
that may well entail some “distance or tension between itself and society.”91
But maintaining this “ ‘optimal gap’ means walking a very fine line in adjust-
ing to social change so as not to become too deviant, but not embracing
change so fully as to lose all distinctiveness.”92
These arguments for combining strictness and openness in religious
organizational life have several implications.  First, organizations that com-
bine significant elements of both features—that is, partly acculturated orga-
nizations—tend, other things being equal, to maintain a vigor that increases
their likelihood of providing valuable services to society.
Second, a good proxy for partial acculturated activity is that an organiza-
tion simultaneously reaches out to non-adherents, to serve or employ them,
but also maintains religiously based standards of conduct that conflict with
general societal norms.  Those conflicts often mean conflicts with law, and
thus such organizations are likely to make claims for accommodation in car-
rying out their activities.  They want to maintain their strict demands, their
unacculturated conduct, as part of their religious identity.  And those on the
other side of such disputes—government itself, or the beneficiaries of the
laws in question—are likely to resist accommodation on the ground that the
organization is harming others with its behavior.
If partly acculturated religious activity as a category makes distinctive
contributions to society, then we ought not to reject accommodation for such
activity out of hand merely because the activity affects non-members in a way
that society has determined is improper.  We ought to make efforts to protect
religious freedom for the organization that affects non-members, as we do
for the organization that remains insular and has little or no effect on the
86 KELLEY, supra note 57, at 58.




91 Id. at 1203.
92 Id.
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broader society.  Of course, protection cannot be absolute, and the regula-
tory interests implicated are different for behavior that affects non-members
than for behavior that affects only members.  But we ought to make as much
room as possible for partly acculturated organizations.
A third implication of the tension between strictness and openness is
more general.  Although some ways of balancing those two qualities are more
likely to produce vigor and contributions to others, there is almost certainly
no single answer that is optimal for every religious organization or activity.
Each organization has to determine the “optimal level of strictness”93 for its
activities in the light of its history and mission, its animating theology, the
nature of the human needs it aims to serve, its size and practical resources,
and probably many other factors.  As I’ve already argued, government should
not force all organizations into one or two models—polar models—of accul-
turation and unacculturation.  It should not reject an organization’s claim
for accommodation of its countercultural religious norms simply because the
activity in question involves non-adherents as employees or clients.
These arguments may show there is value in an organization maintain-
ing strict demands on members and adherents; but do they show there is any
value in extending the demands to non-adherents as well?  I think the answer
is yes.  It is often far from easy to distinguish between adherents and non-
adherents.  If some employees do not have to follow the organization’s rules
of conduct, their example might lead other employees, even adherents of the
faith, to relax their behavior as well.  If this happens, it may activate the cycle
described above: weakened commitment in some may increasingly signal to
others that they can weaken their commitment as well.  Moreover, the organi-
zation also depends on other constituencies, such as donors and volunteers,
many of whom are members.  Some of these may withdraw their own support
if they sense that the organization is relaxing its commitment to its distinctive
standards.  A religious organization that ceases applying its faith-based moral
standards to some of its employees, or in some of its activities, has changed its
identity in a potentially important way, even if the full effect is not immedi-
ately apparent.  Many supporters of the organization will perceive it that way.
To be sure, the claims for the advantages of “strict churches” have been
vigorously debated.  Sociologists and historians have attributed the relative
success of evangelical over mainline churches to multiple factors, such as the
appeal of evangelical individualism and the lower birth rates among mainline
families.94  And Kelley’s thesis continues to provoke criticism today.95
93 Id. at 1202.
94 See, e.g., MARGARET BENDROTH, THE LAST PURITANS: MAINLINE PROTESTANTS AND THE
POWER OF THE PAST 2 (2015) (“There are as many explanations for mainline decline as
there are solutions for remedying it.”); David A. Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues of Fire:
Ecumenical Protestantism and the Modern American Encounter with Diversity, J. AM. HIST. 21, 38
(2011) (noting, as an example of the “differential birth rate,” that “[d]uring the baby
boom Presbyterian women produced only an average of 1.6 children, while evangelical
women produced an average of 2.4”).  Hollinger, however, also acknowledged that “[t]he
central factor [in mainline church decline] was the decision of the children of [their]
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But as already noted, Kelley had a ready response for critics: his argu-
ment, he said, would predict vigor and energy in any church making strict,
countercultural demands, including a church that emphasizes social activ-
ism.96  Again, a liberal church or synagogue might apply a high-demand
sense of activism to serving unauthorized immigrants or the homeless—as do
many Catholic and evangelical organizations.  Any organization, liberal or
conservative, doing such work can come into conflict with strict anti-immigra-
tion laws or zoning regulations.  We should accommodate them in these con-
flicts up to the point where accommodation would unavoidably conflict with
strong state interests.  And we should do the same for any religious organiza-
tion that seeks to follow the demands of its faith, in a conflict with the law,
while providing services to the broader society.
The distinctive value of countercultural elements in religion does not
seem to have disappeared in recent years.  As I have already noted, the find-
ings of Putnam and Campbell, DiIulio, and others indicate that organizations
combining social engagement with countercultural identity are among the
most effective in generating commitment, vigor, and social capital.97  And
with respect to pure numbers, the recent decline of religious identification in
America is most significant in the (more acculturated) mainline churches:
evangelicals are, comparatively speaking, holding their own.98  I am a main-
line Episcopalian; I joined that denomination, after being raised in evangeli-
cal Protestant churches, because I agree with more of its theological positions
on social issues.  But it seems questionable that the mainline churches—or
secular organizations, for that matter—can generate enough vigor or com-
mitment to fill entirely the void that evangelical and Catholic agencies will
leave if they exit charitable work in significant numbers because of religious
freedom issues.
members not to become members themselves”—a factor that could be another manifesta-
tion of the free-rider problem. Id. (“Evangelicals had more children and kept them.”
(emphasis added)).
95 See, e.g., Daniel Schultz, Are Conservative Churches Really Winning by Being More Ortho-
dox?, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Mar. 19, 2013), http://religiondispatches.org/are-conservative
-churches-really-winning-by-being-more-orthodox/ (summarizing arguments against Kel-
ley’s thesis, including studies showing millennials leaving churches because of adherence to
strict rules of conduct).
96 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (quoting KELLEY, supra note 57, at
xxii–xxiii).
97 See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
98 According to the recent Pew survey, between 2007 and 2014, Christians as a percent-
age of the American population declined from 78.4% to 70.6%, a drop of 7.8 percentage
points, or almost 10%.  As already noted, the most precipitous drop was (as in previous
years) among the most acculturated group: mainline Protestants, down 3.4 percentage
points from 18.1% to 14.7%, or nearly 20% in just seven years.  Evangelicals, by contrast,
dropped only 0.9%, i.e., less than 1 percentage point from 26.3% to 25.4%. America’s
Changing Religious Landscape, supra note 58.
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2. Civic Contributions and Religious Freedom
The argument from civic contributions is not simply a policy-based
appeal to preserve the work of effective social-service providers.  The argu-
ment also stands firmly in America’s tradition of religious freedom.  One
important, longstanding strain in that tradition is that we protect religious
exercise because religion, as exercised in voluntary organizations, is an
important contributor to civic virtue.
Timothy Hall, for example, has summarized the case that “the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clauses had their birth, at least partially, in a regard
for religion’s role in creating the circumstances in which civic virtue might
flourish.”99  Most of the framers no doubt thought that popular government
required morality in the citizenry, for if individuals did not exercise self-
restraint, government would have to restrain them and might become tyran-
nical.100  Many of the framers would have thought religion an important con-
tributor to civic morality.  George Washington went so far as to say that
“reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can
prevail in exclusion of religious principle,”101 but it would be enough to con-
clude that religion was an important source of civic virtue.  Professor Hall
summarizes the features of a “fairly modest” case that recognizes religion’s
capacity for harm but still values its “capacity . . . to generate virtue”:
First, religious groups in general continue to provide the associational struc-
tures necessary for training in the idea of the common good. . . .
Religious groups, in the form of voluntary associations, create a context in
which individuals become sharers of a common life, and thus have occasion
to acquire an other-regarding disposition.
Second, religious groups have traditionally preserved didactic resources for
discourse concerning the common good.  The major religions, for example,
have each emphasized perspectives that temper, at least to some degree, the
purely selfish impulses that war against a concept of the public good.
These didactic resources are available for use, and have in fact been used, in
specific discourses about the public good, such as the discourse connected
with the civil rights movement. . . .
Third, religious groups in American society have provided visionary
resources for debate concerning and for pursuit of the public good.  Even if
religious believers, on average, cannot claim any greater level of virtue than
99 Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 87, 88 (1992).
100 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
19–20 (noting that the framers guaranteed religious liberty “in the hope and expectation
[among other reasons] that religious observance would flourish, and with it morality and
self-restraint among the people”).
101 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/washing.asp.
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nonbelievers, one might nevertheless conclude that religions preserve aspi-
rations to virtue that are socially important.102
Partly acculturated religious organizations, as a category, fit these char-
acteristics.  They take religion’s capacity to develop a sense of the common
good, and they apply it to contexts that involve providing services to those in
the broader society.
This approach provides grounds for preserving freedom for religious
organizations even in some instances where they conflict with general socie-
tal norms.  A group may contribute to the common good in various ways even
if it departs from the majority’s understanding of that good in a particular
instance.  This reasoning is exemplified in Washington’s attitude toward the
Quakers, who were roundly condemned during the Revolutionary Era—and
criticized by Washington himself—for refusing to serve in the Continental
Army.  Later, in a well-known letter he sent to Quakers while he was Presi-
dent, Washington wrote that “(except [for] their declining to share with
others the burden of the common defense) there is no denomination among
us, who are more exemplary and useful citizens.”103  He then immediately
assured them that “the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated
with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my wish and desire, that the laws
may always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard to the
protection and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.”104
From a republican perspective, accommodation of the Quakers’ dissenting
religious beliefs makes sense because the same belief system, as a whole,
helps make the Quakers “exemplary and useful citizens.”
As Professor Hall explains, the Framers, even those with a civic-republi-
can perspective, were skeptical of government’s ability to inculcate such vir-
tue directly.  Sponsorship of a favored religion or religions, Madison and
others warned, would corrupt those groups and undermine their capacity to
nurture and mobilize civic virtue.105  Government had to “be satisfied, there-
fore, with the strategy of indirection, by protecting from the encroachments
of government itself those communal forms of existence out of which the
virtues are born.”106  And this strategy extends to the protection of religious
organizations in cases where an organization’s identity is pitted against the
claims of individuals who associate with the organization but depart from its
teaching.  If organizations are not accommodated, “[t]he possibility of free
religious exercise itself is then jeopardized when the associational forms of
102 Hall, supra note 99, at 110–12 (footnotes omitted).
103 Letter from George Washington, President of the U.S., to the Annual Meeting of
Quakers (Sept. 1789), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-
the-annual-meeting-of-quakers/.
104 Id.
105 See Hall, supra note 99, at 120–21.
106 Id. at 124–25 (“[T]he strategy of indirection requires that government attend to the
impact of its own action on religion in an effort to preserve a zone of autonomy in which
religious groups can create those dispositions to virtue which the republic needs but whose
creation it cannot command.” (footnote omitted)).
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existence which religious practice almost invariably inhabits become
extinct.”107  As I have written previously, accommodation
marr[ies] the values of pluralism and civic virtue.  Protection of conscience
and dissent can itself promote the common good by keeping the dissenter
not just free, but free to continue to serve others. . . . Forcing an organiza-
tion to change or minimize a feature of its distinctive identity risks undercut-
ting the organization’s distinctive contributions inspired by that identity.108
Thus, if partly acculturated organizations as a category have a distinctive
capacity to contribute to the broader society, we should make efforts to
accommodate them, instead of forcing them into the poles of acculturation
or unacculturation—again, unless accommodation would unavoidably
undermine strong state interests.
C. Pragmatic Concerns: Should We Drive Religions to Be More Insular?
A final reason to protect partly acculturated religious activity is prag-
matic.  If organizations lose all right to exemption or accommodation when
their activity affects non-adherents, some will respond by becoming wholly
insular.  To preserve their ability to follow their identity and standards of
conduct, they will stop employing or serving persons outside the faith.  To
take one important example, if organizations lose their ability to demand
religiously based standards of conduct of their employees, some—how many
is unclear—will exercise their right to limit their hiring to members of their
own faith.  Federal law guarantees that right in section 702(a) of the Civil
Rights Act, which allows a religious organization to prefer “individuals of a
particular religion” for employment in all its activities, whether the activity is
deemed religious or not.109  That exemption is a relatively secure alternative
for religious organizations; the Supreme Court has unanimously upheld its
constitutionality.110  It is likely to become an increasing resort for organiza-
tions that had hired non-adherents in the past.
Such a development should cause concern.111  Narrower employment
policies by religious organizations may reduce the number of situations in
which non-adherents will be under pressure to follow the religion’s standards
of conduct.  But the cost would be that non-adherents would also have
reduced opportunities for employment with religious organizations (some of
them significant employers).  Whether this would produce a net benefit is
unclear.  Similarly, if religious organizations are never protected in their con-
scientious objections to direct facilitation of clients’ conduct, some will
107 Id. at 128 (“[A]ttention to the ecology of free exercise will require wariness of
attempts to privilege the religious claims of particular individuals over the believing com-
munities in which they are situated.”).
108 Berg, supra note 50, at 316.
109 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a) (2012).
110 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
111 For discussion of some analogous concerns, see Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A
Liberal Argument for Accommodation of Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301 (2016).
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choose to serve only their own members (which they are permitted to do
under many civil-rights laws and ordinances).  They can choose to provide
housing only to their own members;112 they can choose to open their col-
leges or schools only to members.113
Such changes could mean that non-adherents get worse services overall
because they cannot benefit from the distinctive programs and services
offered by religious organizations.114  But the potential costs go beyond that.
Pressuring religious organizations to become more insular will also add
another incentive for societal balkanization, at a time when people already
sort themselves into groups whose members hold similar views across the
whole range of important social issues.115  It is true that if organizations with
countercultural religious standards become more consistently insular, it will
reduce the situations in which non-adherent employees have to follow those
organizations’ standards.  But it will also reduce opportunities for other
employees who are willing to work at such an organization despite its stan-
dards.  And it will reduce opportunities for employees of differing beliefs to
work together in such settings.  These effects too should be considered
before we categorically reject accommodations for organizations in activities
that employ or serve non-adherents.
III. ACCOMMODATING PARTIALLY ACCULTURATED RELIGION
For the reasons above, both courts and legislatures ought to remain
open to protecting religious organizations’ freedom even in activities that
involve non-adherents as employees or clients.  We should avoid forcing all
organizations and activities into the two polar categories: either serving and
employing only their own (fully unacculturated) or conforming to every legal
mandate adopted by the majority (fully acculturated).  Courts should take
this consideration into account as they fashion religious freedom protections
under constitutional and statutory religious-freedom provisions.  And legisla-
tures should do the same as they determine the scope of statutory religious
accommodations.  Section A of this Part develops this argument further.
Of course, to say that partially acculturated organizations and activities
should be protected does not mean that they should be absolutely protected.
Accommodating partially acculturated organizations does present chal-
lenges.  In the very act of reaching out to people outside the faith—as clients
or employees—cannot those organizations cause harm, for example by
demanding standards of conduct from those others?  This issue raises legiti-
112 The federal Fair Housing Act and various state and local laws allow religious organi-
zations to confine sales or rentals of housing they own or operate to members of the faith,
provided membership is not restricted by race. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a); KY. REV. STAT.
tit. 27, § 344.365 (2014); N.Y. CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.12 (2015).
113 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.11 (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02(K)(1) (West 2013).
114 See infra subsection III.B.2.
115 See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA
IS TEARING US APART (2008).
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mate, sometimes difficult problems.  But in the light of the arguments above,
the response should not be to reject accommodations altogether.  Section B
explores solutions to the tensions presented by accommodations for partly
acculturated activity.
A. Means of Accommodation
The arguments for accommodating partly acculturated religious activity
can be translated into legal doctrine in several ways.  The overarching theme
is that courts and legislatures should not refuse to adopt an accommodation
simply because the activity affects employees or clients who are non-adher-
ents of the faith in question.  At the very least, courts should resist the argu-
ment, made in the contraceptive mandate cases, that any accommodation
that “material[ly]” or “noticeabl[y]” affects non-adherent employees or cli-
ents is a violation of the Establishment Clause.116  The Establishment Clause,
as interpreted in cases such as Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,117 does place limits
on the government’s ability to adopt accommodations that impose significant
costs on non-consenting third parties.  But even under the strongest reading
of Caldor, effects on others must be balanced against the legitimate interest
in removing substantial government-imposed burdens on religious exercise,
an interest reflected in the Free Exercise Clause.  Thus the courts should not
declare an accommodation of a religious organization unconstitutional
unless, at the least, the effect on others is disproportionate: if the effect is
serious and the burden the accommodation removes from religious exercise
is minimal.118
Beyond that, courts should be willing to protect partly acculturated activ-
ity under religious freedom statutes—RFRA119 or its state counterparts120—
or under state constitutional provisions.121  Courts should not assume that
avoiding effects on non-adherents is always a “compelling interest” justifying
denial of an exemption to protect religion under these provisions.  They
should examine the seriousness of the effect, again in light of the seriousness
of the burden on religious exercise that the accommodation would remove.
And they should require government to pursue alternative means of regula-
116 See generally, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 5, at 363–71 (expanding on this
point).
117 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
118 For fuller defenses of such a standard, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 703 (1992), and
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103,
142–43 (2015).
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012); see also Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc–5.
120 See, e.g., Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
121 See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275.
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tion that would limit harmful effects on others but still avoid serious burdens
on a religious organization’s freedom.
Finally, legislatures should be willing to extend statutory accommoda-
tions in specific contexts to include partly acculturated activities, within
appropriate limits.
An important example of the interplay of various means of accommoda-
tion—specific statutory provisions and general religious-freedom standards—
comes in the context where a nonprofit religious organization employs non-
adherents to carry out its religiously grounded mission.  This context also
exemplifies one of the considerations discussed in Part II: namely, that refus-
ing to accommodate religious organizations in activities that involve non-
adherents of the faith may well push many such organizations to become
narrower and more insular, declining to hire or even serve non-adherents.122
This issue has become prominent because of recent advances in sexual-
orientation nondiscrimination legislation and regulations.  As noted
above,123 federal employment-discrimination law gives religious organiza-
tions an exemption—the “section 702 exemption”—permitting them to dis-
criminate in hiring by preferring “individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with [the organization’s] activities.”124  Case law
interpreting the section 702 exemption makes clear that it gives religious
organizations the freedom to hire with respect not just to belief and affilia-
tion, but also to religiously grounded standards of conduct, which would
include avoiding abortion, or confining intimate sexual activity to a male-
female marriage.125  The decisions hold that when an organization demands
that individuals adhere to a standard of conduct, it is preferring individuals
“of a particular religion.”126  The courts have concluded, in the words of the
Third Circuit, that “Congress intended [this and similar] explicit exemptions
of Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain commu-
nities composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal practices.”127
But the decisions protecting conduct standards have almost all involved suits
by the plaintiff for religious discrimination, to which the section 702 exemp-
tion is clearly a defense.  And several decisions state that the exemption does
122 See supra Section II.C.
123 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a).
125 See, e.g., Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (702 exemp-
tion protected Catholic teacher who signed a pro-choice newspaper advertisement); Hall v.
Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000) (exemption protected Bap-
tist institution that discharged administrator/mentor who was in a lesbian relationship);
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (exemption protected a Catholic school that
hired a Protestant teacher but discharged her for marrying a Catholic without getting her
previous marriage annulled).
126 See, e.g., Little, 929 F.2d at 951 (“[T]he permission to employ persons ‘of a particular
religion’ includes permission to employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consis-
tent with the employer’s religious precepts.” (emphasis added)).
127 See Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 141 (quoting Little, 929 F.3d at 951); Herx v. Diocese of
Ft. Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
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not allow religious organizations to make employment decisions “on the basis
of race, sex, or national origin,” other grounds prohibited under Title VII.128
If the latter line of cases is read broadly, then the section 702 exemption
will have no application to plaintiffs’ claims other than those for religious
discrimination.129  If so, then if and when sexual orientation becomes a pro-
hibited category in the law and a plaintiff sues on that ground, an organiza-
tion’s moral-conduct policy that makes any distinction between same-sex and
opposite-sex conduct would not be sheltered by the exemption—no matter
how deeply that rule is grounded in the religion’s moral teachings.  Com-
mentators like Marty Lederman and Rose Saxe have already reached that
conclusion with respect to President Obama’s 2014 executive order prohibit-
ing federal contractors from engaging in sexual-orientation discrimina-
tion.130  On the other hand, Professor Carl Esbeck has argued that the
exemption continues to apply when “the employer is a religious organization
and . . . there is a religious belief or practice behind its staffing decision.”131
128 See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding the exemption does not authorize discrimination between men and women in
enforcing standards against extramarital sexual conduct); Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Mem-
phis, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996).
129 For arguments in support of this conclusion, see Martin Lederman, Why the Law
Does Not (and Should Not) Allow Religiously Motivated Contractors to Discriminate Against Their
LGBT Employees, BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS (July 31, 2014),
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/why-the-law-does-not-and-should-not-al
low-religiously-motivated-contractors-to-discriminate-against-their-lgbt-employees, and Rose
Saxe, The Truth About Religious Employers and Civil Rights Laws, BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION,
PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS (July 28, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/corner
stone/non-discrimination-executive-order-and-religious-freedom/responses/the-truth-
about-religious-employers-and-civil-rights-laws.
130 Id.  Obama’s order is Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
The 2014 order leaves in place a 2002 George W. Bush executive order stating that the 702
exemption protects federal contractors, but the Bush order does not resolve the issue
whether section 702 protects against claims other than religious discrimination. See Exec.
Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141, § 4(c) (Dec. 12, 2002) (amending Exec. Order
11,246, § 204(c), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965)).
131 Carl H. Esbeck, Federal Contractors, Title VII, and LGBT Employment Discrimination: Can
Religious Organizations Continue to Staff on a Religious Basis?, 4 OXFORD J.L. & REL. 368, 372
(2015).
Even if religious organizations receiving funding are not protected in their religious
hiring preferences by section 702, they might be protected by the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act.  The denial of funding can be a “substantial burden” triggering strong free
exercise protection. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).  But there is an ongoing debate about precisely when a denial
creates such a burden. Compare Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Dep’t of Justice, Opinion
Letter on Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant
Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (June 29, 2007), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2007/06/31/worldvision.pdf (conclud-
ing that withdrawing funding because organization hires only religious adherents would
violate RFRA), with IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT TUTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW—2008: A CUMU-
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If the section 702 exemption shields only against claims of religious dis-
crimination, organizations that want to claim its protection will have to show
that their moral-conduct policy involves only religious discrimination and no
other prohibited grounds.  They might be able to argue that they apply an
extramarital conduct policy consistently to all persons132—but they will face
the counterargument that the organization’s definition of marriage itself
incorporates a distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex relations.  An
organization’s safer course will be to show that it discriminates against all
persons who believe in the legitimacy of same-sex marriage, not just those
who engage in same-sex activity.  In order to show discrimination based solely
on belief, the organization may well have to require a statement of faith from
all employees that includes explicit disapproval of same-sex conduct.
For many organizations, requiring such a statement is likely to change
them dramatically, forcing them to be far narrower in their reach: far less
open to hiring persons of differing theological views, far more demanding of
uniformity of belief not just in large outline but in details.  It will push them
to be more insular, less open to the broader society.  It will push them to be
wholly unacculturated.
B. Limiting Negative Effects from Accommodations
As I’ve already suggested, accommodations of religious exercise that
affect non-adherents (employees or clients) do raise distinctive concerns.
Effects on non-adherents do not justify rejecting accommodation altogether,
for the reasons already given; but they should be considered in determining
the scope of accommodation.  Harmful effects from accommodations can be
limited through two means: notice to the affected persons and alternatives
for the provisions of services.
1. Notice
First, it is important that clients and employees of partially acculturated
religious organizations have some notice of the religious practices that could
affect them and that could conflict with applicable laws.  Without notice,
employees may find themselves subject to unexpected standards of conduct
that they cannot easily escape.  The consequences of lack of notice are often
LATIVE REPORT ON LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH FAITH-
BASED ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (criticizing the OLC analysis).
132 Even the Cline and Boyd decisions above held that discharging an employee for
being pregnant would be religious discrimination protected by the exemption—and not
sex discrimination—if the organization would also fire a male whose extramarital sexual
conduct led to a pregnancy. Cline, 206 F.3d at 658 (“[C]ourts have made clear that if the
school’s purported ‘discrimination’ is based on a policy of preventing nonmarital sexual
activity which emanates from the religious and moral precepts of the school, and if that
policy is applied equally to its male and female employees, then the school has not discrim-
inated based on pregnancy in violation of Title VII.” (citing Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414–15)).
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less severe for clients, who often can find another provider relatively easily.133
But one reason why religious-objection cases involving for-profit businesses—
the baker, the florist—trouble many people is that the nature of the entity
will not likely give customers notice that it follows distinctive religious norms.
We can debate whether the refusal of a commercial good or service on a
ground prohibited by law constitutes a sufficient harm to override religious
freedom per se—that is, even when there are readily accessible alternatives.
But the absence of notice is cause for concern, and displaying a sign ahead of
time saying, “We don’t serve same-sex weddings” creates its own problems.134
But the matter is different for organizations that are known as religious.
Professors Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe have
been energetic critics of religious-exemption claims by for-profit businesses,
but they have acknowledged that religious nonprofit organizations are differ-
ent.  There is often, they say, a “reasonable expectation that employees who
work for churches and religious-affiliated nonprofits understand that their
employers are focused on advancing a religious mission.”135  “Reasonable
expectation” is another term for notice—that the employer is religious and
may apply certain religiously based standards of conduct.
Notice and expectations concerning religious organizations also parallel
the concept of “implied consent,” which as Michael Helfand reminds us, has
long been important in our religious liberty tradition.136  As far back as Wat-
son v. Jones in 1872, the Court said: “All who unite themselves to [a religious]
body do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to
submit to it.”137  This does not apply only to those who choose to be mem-
bers of the church.  It also applies, presumptively at least, to non-members
who agree to work for the organization.  Because their loyalty is crucial to the
organization’s following its mission, they should presumptively be held to
have consented, implicitly, to those principles that are foundational to that
mission.
Helfand rightly says there must be some basis to infer such consent:
something beyond corporate documents, something apparent that would
133 Not always, of course.  Even many who would urge exemptions for small wedding
photographers or florists would balk at allowing a bed-and-breakfast to refuse to serve a
same-sex couple—in part because a surprise refusal of lodging can cause serious costs.
134 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 198–200 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (exploring benefits
and costs of measures requiring small businesses to post their objections to serving same-
sex marriages ahead of time).
135 See Micah Schwartzman et al., Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part III:
Reconciling Amos and Cutter, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause_9.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VWZ
6-JEA6 (emphasis added).
136 See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of
Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (2015); Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?: Implied
Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401, 415–18 (2013)
[hereinafter Helfand, What is a “Church”?].
137 See 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1872).
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lead employees to expect that the organization may apply religious norms to
their conduct.138  The same point could apply to clients’ notice that the
organization may have religious norms limiting the conduct it is willing to
facilitate.  Helfand suggests that religious elements should have to be “inte-
grated into the day-to-day operations of an institution[,] through pervasive
religious symbols, organized religious prayer,” or other “‘clear’ and ‘obvi-
ous’” manifestations of its religious mission.139  Such a test seems too strict,
at least if it serves as the exclusive means of establishing notice and implicit
consent.  An organization may be deeply religiously motivated but engage in
service activities without an explicitly articulated religious message.  For some
organizations, the essence of their mission, to paraphrase words often attrib-
uted (or misattributed) to St. Francis, is to “preach the Gospel” but not nec-
essarily “use words.”
But there should be reasonable notice in some form.  Religious organi-
zations that do not have explicit religious elements in their programs should
make it reasonably apparent to employees—through the employee hand-
book or contract or some other means—that religious norms may apply.
(This can have costs for the organization: there is a revolt in the San Fran-
cisco’s Catholic archdiocese because the archbishop added restrictive “moral
conduct clauses” to the faculty handbook for Catholic schools.140)  I would
not require, however, that the language be highly specific, for example iden-
tifying each particular practice.  A general statement should suffice to put
employees on notice.  Given the importance of protecting partly acculturated
religious organizations, the concept of reasonable notice should not be inter-
preted in a way that makes it impossible for an organization to ask its employ-
ees to adhere to norms of conduct.
2. Alternative Providers
The second concept is that of alternatives, which make possible exit
from, or avoidance of, religious rules in the sphere of social services.  A relig-
ious social-service organization should not be made to violate its religious
identity merely to ensure that it does not deny a client service, when such
clients have alternative providers from whom they can receive the service.
But religious organizations may be denied regulatory exemptions when they
occupy “chokepoints,” where they can substantially limit others’ access to ser-
vices or employment.
138 See Helfand, What is a “Church”?, supra note 136, at 422 (“Under an implied consent
approach, judicial inquiry evaluating whether an organization is a ‘religious institution’
should focus less on the corporate structure of the institution and more on the extent to
which the religious character of the institution was open and obvious to its employees.”).
139 Id. at 420–24.
140 See, e.g., Catholics in San Francisco Rally Against “Morality Clauses”, CRUX (May 21,
2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/life/2015/05/21/catholics-in-san-francisco-rally-against-
morality-clauses-2/; Carol Pogash, Morals Clause in Catholic Schools Roils Bay Area, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/us/archbishop-cordileone-of-san-
francisco-defends-changes.html?r=0.
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Religious organizations who object to a legal requirement seldom
occupy chokepoints, in services or employment.  Usually they are a small part
of a much larger range of providers, secular and religious, most of which
have no objection.  But there are exceptions.  For example, there should be
no accommodation for religious hospitals in the provision of most medical
services, certainly not if the hospital has market power in such provision.  By
contrast, in the cases involving Catholic adoption agencies and nondiscrimi-
nation requirements, there were generally numerous agencies happy to place
children with same-sex couples.141  Accommodation could have preserved
the Catholic agencies’ ability to deliver effective services and adhere to their
beliefs, without depriving anyone of meaningful access.
The role of alternatives was dramatized in the series of judicial and regu-
latory decisions on whether religious organizations receiving federal funding
to assist human-trafficking victims must offer abortion or contraception
options to the people they serve.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA) of 2000142 appropriated funds to assist victims of trafficking, prima-
rily women and children.  Originally HHS, charged with implementing the
statute, awarded grants directly to a variety of nonprofit organizations work-
ing with trafficking victims; but in 2006, HHS decided to designate a general
contractor to administer the funds, distributing them to subcontractors.143
HHS chose the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), whose gen-
eral ability to assist victims is well documented.  But the HHS contract also
allowed the USCCB to refuse to provide, fund, or refer for abortion or con-
traceptive services because, as the USCCB’s contract bid explained, those
activities “would be contrary to [Catholic] moral convictions and religious
beliefs.”144  The contract also allowed the USCCB to put the same limitation
on its subcontractors, many of which were not Catholic organizations.145  In
American Civil Liberties Union v. Sebelius,146 a federal district judge held that
this provision violated the Establishment Clause because it “delegated author-
ity to a religious organization to impose religiously based restrictions on the
expenditure of taxpayer funds, and thereby impliedly endorsed the religious
beliefs of the USCCB and the Catholic Church.”147
The district court’s Establishment Clause reasoning has significant weak-
nesses, but it makes an important point.  The weaknesses lie in the fact that
141 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Let Catholics Discriminate, METRO WEEKLY (Mar. 29, 2006),
http://www.metroweekly.com/2006/03/let-catholics-discriminate/ (noting that in Massa-
chusetts, “[g]ay couples could still adopt through dozens of other private agencies or
through the state child-welfare services department itself, which places most adoptions in
the state”).
142 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–13 (2012).
143 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Mass. 2012),
vacated as moot, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d
44 (1st Cir. 2013) (expiration of contract).
144 Id. at 476–77.
145 Id. at 477–78.
146 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Mass. 2012).
147 Id. at 488.
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the court equated an accommodation of religious conscience with other gov-
ernment actions—endorsement of religion and delegation of government
power to a church—that raise Establishment Clause concerns.  An accommo-
dation is usually not an endorsement of the beliefs in question; after all, an
accommodation relieves a burden that exists because the law in question has
rejected the burdened organization’s beliefs.  And although the Supreme
Court has held that government may not delegate to a church the discretion
to exercise a government power—in particular, the unlimited discretion to
veto a liquor license for a nearby business148—the Court’s concern there was
that the church might use the discretion not to protect itself from the harms
a bar might cause, but to award an illegitimate benefit (the license) to its
members.149  It is quite different when the government identifies and
addresses, through accommodation, a specific conflict between its legislation
and religious beliefs.  Such a provision protects a religious claimant’s legiti-
mate, constitutionally recognized interest in maintaining fidelity to its relig-
ious norms while still operating in the civil sphere (including serving others).
Virtually any accommodation of religion could be recast as a “delegation” to
a religious group to affect the application of law.  But that is misguided: free-
ing a religion from state restriction is not the same as giving it state power.
Nevertheless, the important truth in the district court decision is that the
USCCB appeared to operate as a “chokepoint,” with power to control access
to abortion and contraception options for all persons receiving assistance
under the TVPA.  That is because assistance was channeled through the
“master contract” with the USCCB, and the exclusion of abortion and contra-
ception there applied as well to all subcontractors.  Accordingly, the USCCB
appeared to deny significant options to third parties because they lacked
alternatives for pursuing those options.
But in the next round of TVPA contracting after the USCCB arrange-
ment expired, the Obama Administration’s HHS overreacted to the previous
problems.  It shifted from awarding one nationwide master contract to sign-
ing multiple contracts with different organizations—a positive development
that might have allowed for cooperation both with organizations that provide
abortion and contraception and those that do not.  But it also determined to
“give strong preference” to organizations that will offer all victims referral to
“family planning services and the full range of legally permissible gynecologi-
cal and obstetric care,” including abortion and contraception.150  Under the
148 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
149 Id. at 125 (objecting that the veto might “be used by churches to promote goals
beyond insulating the church from undesirable neighbors; it could be employed for explic-
itly religious goals, for example, favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation
or adherents of that faith”).
150 OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, NATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(2011), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/foa/files/HHS-2011-ACF-ORR-ZV-
0148_0.htm (emphasis added); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union, 705 F.3d at 50 (noting that
“[t]hese terms were markedly different from those in the 2005 [process]”).
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new process, the USCCB failed to receive one of the grants despite an other-
wise strong track record on the provision of services.  Thus, where once the
Bush Administration allowed the USCCB to require that every subsidized
provider exclude abortion and contraception, now the Obama Administra-
tion virtually requires that every subsidized provider include them.  Neither
course is well suited for handling matters on which people are deeply
divided.  The Obama Administration’s policy will increase the availability of
services in some ways, but it will also likely produce significant losses.  Some
trafficking victims would likely be better served by the Catholic agency—
because they are Catholic themselves, but also for other reasons—and do not
want abortion or contraceptive services.  Instead of considering the possibility
of a diverse variety of providers, the government wrongly jumped from one
version of uniformity to another.
CONCLUSION
Claims for the protection of partly acculturated religious activity present
challenges and tensions.  The scope of protection must of course take
account of effects that these activities have on non-adherents, whether
employees or clients.  But refusing such protection has serious costs.  The
opposition to any accommodations for religious activity that affect non-
adherents has the effect—and very possibly the aim—of marginalizing orga-
nizations that straddle the line between their own members and the broader
society.  It will force these organizations to deal only with their own adher-
ents, and play less and less of a role in the broader society, if they want to
adhere to their doctrinal beliefs.  For all the reasons above, this would be a
bad development: for religious equality, for the vigor of our educational and
social service sectors, and for our ability to engage with each other across
lines of disagreement.
